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Abstract
We introduce a novel real time anomaly intrusion detection method using a multivariate
statistical technique based on principal component analysis (PCA) to detect new anoma-
lies. In fact, new attack forms are increasing each day and most of the current intrusion
detection systems are signature based ones. As a result, these signature based tools fail
to detect the new attacks. For this reason, network traffic modeling should be done in
order to apply anomaly detection methods directly on the new modeled traffic. Different
characteristics of the network traffic are analyzed, packet by packet, using PCA and sig-
nificant statistical measures are considered to discover the difference between the normal
(legitimate) and abnormal (called also illegitimate or attacks) traffic. An algorithm issued
from the different statistical measures is discussed and the different results, performed
over real time traffic corresponding to the different flooding DDoS attacks and the slam-
mer worm that has infected more than 100; 000 vulnerable servers over internet in less
than ten minutes, are presented.
Keywords
Principal Component Analysis, Statistical Measures, Anomaly Intrusion Detection, Novel
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1. Introduction
Intrusion detection is a challenging problem that has received much attention during the
past two decades by many researchers. Most of the work done in this area is based on
misuse detection. In fact, there are two main approaches; anomaly detection and misuse
detection. The former consists in learning the normal behavior of a user (application, net-
work traffic, or system events) profile and then observing the actual activities as reported
in the audit data (network traffic, application data, etc.) to ultimately detect any significant
deviations from the normal profiles. The latter consists in writing precise signatures and/or
patterns in a database and then monitoring current system activities for such signatures or
patterns and reporting the different matches.
With the increasing prolification of new high speed networks, intrusion detection sys-
tems should be improved to face the wide gap that is being created between the current
IDSs and the emerging high speed networks. In our knowledge, there is not any tool being
able to detect intrusions in the new generation networks since the majority of the methods
used to discover the different signatures in the network traffic are NP Complete. As an
example Snort [?] used Boyer Moore technique then Aho Corasik/Boyer Moore from Sil-
icon Defense [?] and Boyer-Moore-Horsepool from LANL/RADIANT [?] which are NP
Complete rendering this tool unable to analyze traffic in high speed networks exceeding
30 Mbits/sec.
Current hackers know that the different intrusion detection tools deployed in our gov-
ernment, military and commercial computer systems are misuse based ones. This a priori
knowledge of the different IDS tools encourages the attackers to implement new attacks
that could not be detected by the deployed IDSs since they are most of the time signature
based ones. The distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and the slammer [?] oc-
curred respectively in 2000 and 2003 are such attack examples that were neither detected
by the different IDSs nor prevented by the different access control tools or any other com-
puter security mechanisms deployed for countering the devastating attacks. As a result
of this situation, our computer systems are easily hacked and much confidential data are
stolen and used maliciously by these new hackers.
Another problem of the actual IDSs is the time that should be invested by the system
administrator to configure and manage the different deployed IDSs. Since the number
of new vulnerabilities discovered each year is comprised between 1; 000 and 2; 000. A
potential attacker has each day from 3 to 6 new vulnerabilities to exploit and the admin-
istrator must review continuously her security policy. However, many small companies
lack dedicated computer security personnel and system administrators must play the role
of the security site officer. Facing this dilemma, the attackers will never stop their mali-
cious activities, against targeted companies or commercial sites, to reach their goals that
may be political, economical, etc.
During the last decade a new intrusion detection model based on alert correlation that
permits to reduce the amount of the alarms launched by the different sensors is widely
investigated. There are many models and approaches that are introduced. CRIM [?] and
CARDS [?] using a semi explicit correlation and others using an explicit model such as
LAMBDA [?] and Adele [?]. Other implicit correlation models are widely investigated in
the literature.
These correlation approaches aggregate and correlate alerts to reduce false positive
alarms generated by the different sensors deployed in the audited system. Another task of
these techniques is to discover attack scenarios when using explicit correlation and new
attack scenarios in the case of semi explicit correlation.
Current correlation techniques use alerts from misuse intrusion detection tools. How-
ever, one main reproach to misuse detection is that they do not detect any new attack. In
addition, more than 90% of the different alerts generated by these tools are false positives
ones. The DARPA98 datasets [?] is an example where snort (configured with the recently
updated signature database) generates thousands of alerts where 95% are false positives
and only 5% are positive alarms corresponding to real attacks. Many known attacks can
easily bypass all signature based detection tools. A simple method consists in modifying
the freely downloadable source code of the different known attack tools.
Therefore, these correlation tools may not detect attack scenarios where all or some
of its composing elementary attacks are not detected. In [?] virtual alerts are generated
to fulfill the gaps in the ongoing scenario. This suggestion may not be anymore valuable
since a lot of alerts are not detected when using these signature based IDS tools that
generate much more false positives than positive alerts.
In this paper, we address the issue of improving the current IDSs in order to detect
new attacks, consider their performance in high speed networks and take into account the
administrator time constraint.
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Our proposed method is based on principal component analysis (PCA) a multivariate
statistical approach that has proven its efficiency in space reduction and is discussed in
many application areas such image analysis, face recognition and time series prediction.
In [?], we used this method as a supervised technique to detect abnormal profiles. It
consisted in modeling a user (application, system calls, ...) profile and then projecting all
new profiles onto the new feature space generated by the new principal axes correspond-
ing to the principal components. A decision is taken whether a new profile is normal or
abnormal by only comparing its feature vector in the novel space generated by the princi-
pal components to the learned behaviors during the learning phase. In [?], we applied PCA
as a reduction method before applying any learning machine algorithm to the KDD99 in-
trusion detection datasets [?]. The results outperformed much of the previous work done
over these datasets. We demonstrated its efficiency in detecting high alarm rates in less
time when compared to other methods.
In this paper, we use PCA not as a supervised technique but as an unsupervised one in
which we do not have any knowledge about the attacks or normal traffic; i.e. the different
datasets are not labeled a priori.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following. Section 2 presents related work in
intrusion detection. Section 3 presents a description of the principal component analysis
method then in section ??, a network traffic modeling method using the Bro tool [?], in
order to supply meaningful measures to the PCA engine, is presented. Finally, sections
?? and ?? respectively present the different results obtained from the experimentation and
give some concluding remarks for future work.
2. Related Work
IDES [?] of SRI uses host based activities (e.g. CPU usage, file accesses, number of in-
correct logins, etc.). The different normal activities are described as measures and their
probability distributions are learned to be compared to new activities to detect any devi-
ation. Forrest et al. [?] uses a technique that models the way an application or a service
running on a machine normally behaves by registering the invoked sequences of system
calls. An intrusion is assumed to exercise abnormal paths in the executable code, and is
detected when new sequences are observed. Debar et al. [?] enhanced this method by
considering fixed and variable length of the different system calls that are collected from
a process execution. Their model minimizes the false negative alarm rate. In [?], Land et
al. used a similar approach but they focused on an incremental algorithm that updates the
stored sequences and uses data from UNIX shell commands. Schonlau et al. [?] moni-
tored a set of UNIX users and collected a database of shell commands then discusses a
statistical method based on principal regression model to discover masqueradors in the
test datasets. Fan et al. [?] proposed a method that generates artificial anomalies to detect
unknown and known network intrusions. They combined anomaly and misuse detection
models that detect some known and unknown intrusions using the 10% of the KDD99
learning database [?].
Taylor et al. [?] introduced a lightweight approach anomaly approach that may be
used with little human involvement in the system management and configuration. They
implemented a statistical anomaly detection technique that may be deployed in high speed
network for its speed and ease of use. However, a possible weakness of this method is a
potential higher false positive rate and its design for a limited attack scope. They suggest
to use only some IP header packets fields to analyze the traffic to detect the presence
of attacks in the monitored network in real time. They used a cluster based method and
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principal component analysis for data visualization in a 3D space. They suggested that a
total population (packets) of between 250 to 350 yielded good cluster results [?].
Our proposal uses the different interesting ideas from the Taylor’s work in identifying
network intrusion by only using some fields of the IP packet header to discover new
attacks. We use our knowledge and experience of principal component analysis in the
field of intrusion detection to enhance the detection model of new attacks by investigating
some statistical measures that can be easily used to detect those new attacks without a
priori knowledge in real time.
3. Principal Component Analysis
The most common definition of PCA, due to Hotelling [?], is that, for a set of N ob-
served d   dimensional data vectors v
i
; i 2 f1; ::; Ng, the q principal axes w
j
; j 2
f1; ::; qg, are those orthonormal axes onto which the retained variance under projection
is maximal. It can be shown that the vectors w
j
are given by the q dominant eigenvec-
tors (i.e. those with the largest associated eigenvalues) of the simple covariance matrix
C =
P
i
(v
i
 v)(v
i
 v)
T
N
such that Cw
j
= 
j
w
j
and where v is the simple mean. The vec-
tor u
i
=W
T
(v
i
 v), where W = fw
1
; w
2
; : : : ; w
q
g, is thus a q dimensional reduced
representation of the observed vector v
i
.
Therefore, principal component analysis (PCA) is a mathematical procedure that trans-
forms a number of (possibly) correlated variables into a (smaller) number of uncorrelated
variables called principal components. The objective of principal component analysis is
to reduce the dimensionality (number of variables) of the dataset but retain most of the
original variability in the data. The first principal component accounts for as much of the
variability in the data as possible, and each succeeding component accounts for as much
of the remaining variability as possible.
In this section we investigate the principal component analysis as a multivariate sta-
tistical approach. First, we examine the different principles of PCA before analysis and
deciding whether data need to be standardized or not. Afterwards, we recall the definitions
of some statistical measures that will be used in the next sections.
Before the calculation of the principal components, the data are mean-centered. This
means that from each observation of a specific variable, the mean of all observations (of
that variable) will be subtracted. This can be accomplished by making sure that the data
set of the considered points is centered at the origin.
3.1 Data mean centering
Assume that we haveN observed d dimensional data vectors v
i
; i 2 f1; ::; Ng. There-
fore, the mean v may be calculated as the following:
v =
1
N
N
X
i=1
v
i
(1)
Then each new centered vector differs from the origin by:

i
= v
i
  v (2)
A covariance matrix C is then considered to calculate the different Principal Compo-
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nents (PCs):
C
(dd)
=
1
N
N
X
i=1

i

T
i
(3)
The Principal components are then calculated as the eigenvectors of the covariance
matrix C
(dd)
.
In practice, it often occurs that different elements are completely different types of
measurements. Some might be length, temperature, CPU time usage, etc. In such a case,
the structure of the PCs will depend on the choice of units of measurement. Variable
standardization is thus necessary.
3.2 Data standardization
The big drawback of PCA based on covariance matrices is the sensitivity of the PCs
to the measurements units used for each element of the different variables. If there are
large differences between the variances of elements of the different variables, then those
variables whose variances are largest will tend to dominate the first few PCs. Therefore,
we use a correlation matrix instead of a covariance matrix.
Having N observed d   dimensional data vectors v
i
; i 2 f1; ::; Ng = V
(dN)
, the
correlation matrix R of the observed population is:
R
(dd)
=
1
N
N
X
i=1

i

T
i
= AA
T (4)
where

i;j
=
V
ij
  v
i

i
; (5)

i
=
v
u
u
t
1
N
N
X
i=1
(V
ij
  v
i
)
2 (6)
and
A =
1
p
N
[
1
;
2
; : : : ;
N
℄ (7)

i
corresponds to the standard deviation for each measurement of the population consid-
ered in the experiment.
In the case of standardized data, the principal components correspond to the eigenvec-
tors of the correlation matrix R.
Another problem with the use of covariance matrices is that it is more difficult than
with correlation matrices to compare informally the results from different analysis. Sizes
of variances of PCs have the same implications for different correlation matrices of the
same dimension, but not for different covariance matrices. Also, patterns of coefficients in
PCs can be readily compared for different correlation matrices to see if the two correlation
matrices are giving similar PCs, whereas informal comparisons are often much trickier for
covariance matrices.
The loading coefficients are used in our experiments. They are the correlations be-
tween the original variables and the new variables. They are informative as they give an
indication to which extent the original variables are important in forming new PCs and
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then new variables. The higher the loading, the more influential the variable is in forming
the principal components score and vice versa. Hence, if the loading coefficient between a
new principal component and one variable from the dataset is positive then this indicates
that the considered variable is very influential in forming that principal component.
We used the Pearson’s correlation coefficient r which quantifies the measure of the
strength of the association between two variables.
Considering two n   dimensional variables X and Y , the formula for Pearson’s
correlation takes on many forms. A commonly used formula is expressed in equation ??:
r =
P
n
i=1
X
i
Y
i
 
1
n
P
n
i=1
X
i
P
n
i=1
Y
i
q
P
n
i=1
X
2
i
 
1
n
(
P
n
i=1
X
i
)
2
q
P
n
i=1
Y
2
i
 
1
n
(
P
n
i=1
Y
i
)
2
(8)
Having these definitions and statistical measures on one hand, and facing the problem
of intrusion detection and current high speed networks on the other hand, we use these
statistical results to detect new network intrusions by checking only the different header
packet fields and, for instance, a hash function value of the current analyzed packet pay-
load. The following section presents the tool we used to generate the different interesting
fields that are used by the principal component engine to detect new anomalies and a fast
computational method to calculate the different eigenvectors and eigenvalues.
4. Network traffic modeling using Bro
There are many free IDSs tools available over Internet. Since we have a significant oper-
ational experience with Bro [?] and have analyzed this tool in a high speed network of up
to 100 Mbps, we chose it as a traffic translator of real time network traffic into connection
records that may be easily used by many machine learning and/or data mining algorithms.
In fact, Bro is divided into an event engine that reduces a kernel-filtered network traffic
stream into a series of higher-level events, and a policy script interpreter that interprets
event handlers written in a proper language used to express a site’s security policy. Fur-
thermore, it comes with rich policy scripts that takes into account a variety of transport
layer protocols. It also offers a powerful signature matching capability by using regular
expressions to detect network intrusions.
We exploited the ability of this tool and we implemented a Bro event handler to output,
in real time, a summarized record for each IP packet header.
Of course, we only use Bro as an event handler to output the different packets parsed
fields in real time but not as an IDS as shown in figure ??.
Since we are interested in using our tool in high speed networks, we only extract some
features from the IP header of the packets to be analyzed and only, for the current experi-
ments, a hash value of the packet’s payload . Figure ?? shows these different features.
Where :
1. IP Source coresponds to the source IP address of the packet (4 numbers for IPv4 and 6
for IPv6). In our experiments we are only interested in IPv4 protocol. The same feature
vector will be used for the IPv6 protocol using 6 numbers.
2. Port Src is the IANA source port number of the packet.
3. IP Dest coresponds to the destination IP address of the packet (4 or 6 numbers).
4. Port Dest is the IANA destination port number of the packet.
5. Protocol corresponds to the protocol type of the packet; TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc.
6. Packet Length is the length of the packet.
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Figure 1: Bro and PCA Engine Architecture.
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Figure 2: The feature vector of a packet.
7. Data Hash corresponds to the signature value of the whole payload using an md5hash
function.
The packets after being processed by the Bro tool as presented in ?? are then presented
directly to the PCA Engine. We have already used PCA in learning users’ profiles in a
local area network [?], however, we used principal component as a supervised method
where in the first stage, we learn the behaviors of the different users and then compare a
new profile with the already learned profiles. In this paper, we use PCA as an unsupervised
technique on the network traffic where we do not have any knowledge of the traffic and
if whether it is normal or not. In addition, we use it here in real time and over network
traffic. So, first we model the traffic and transform it into feature vectors as explained
above and then apply PCA to the recently captured packets.
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In our experiments we considered d = 250 to 350 packets to calculate the different
statistical measures explained in the previous section; i.e:
1. Standard deviation of each principal component of the d considered packets,
2. Proportion of variance for each principal component, and
3. Loading value, using the Pearson’s correlation coefficient (see equation ??), for each
feature with each principal component.
Since the different variables correspond to different statistical measures then a data
standardization is necessary and a correlation matrix R should be calculated to find out
the corresponding principal components. Each variable, in our experiments, is a d (250 
d  350) dimensional vector, the matrix R is d by d and determining the d eigenvalues
and eigenvectors is an intractable task when considering hundred of packets in real time
and in the new generation high speed networks. So, a computational feasible method may
be used to improve the processing time;
Let U
k
be the kth eigenvector of the correlation matrix R
dd
given in equation (4), 
k
the associated eigenvalue and
U = [U
1
U
2
: : :U
d
℄ the matrix of these eigenvectors (that we call here eigenpackets).
Then
RU
k
= 
k
U
k
(9)
such that
U
T
k
U
n
=

1 si k = n
0 si k 6= n (10)
Hence, from equations (??) and (4), we obtain
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T
U
k
= 
k
U
k
(11)
A
T
A (A
T
U
k
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k
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T
U
k
) (12)
Let
Y
k
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T
U
k
(13)
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A
T
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k
= 
k
Y
k
(14)
From equation (??), Y
k
is the eigenvector of ATA and 
k
is its corresponding eigen-
value.
Let X
k
= 
k
Y
k
, so X
k
is also an eigenvector of ATA
From equation (??)
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(15)
we have UT
k
U = 1
then
X
T
k
X
k
= 
2
k

k
(16)
In order to obtain a normalized vector X
k
(i:e: X
T
k
X
k
= 1) we shall have

2
k

k
= 1) 
k
=
1
p

k
(17)
From equations (??) and (??), we have
AY
k
= AA
T
U
k
(18)
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(20)
finally, we have
U
k
=
1
p

k
AX
k
(21)
With this analysis, the calculation is highly reduced, from the order (of the number) of
the considered packets in each batch (250  d  350) to the order of the number of the
packet IP features considered for the analysis, because X
k
is an eigenvector of the matrix
A
T
A having a reduced dimension N (N = 13 features in our case).
This analysis is highly useful to use PCA in real time. However, [?] used the same
method we introduced in [?] but did not manage to exploit this transformation in order
to gain time and then their system, using MATLAB, consumes much more time than
expected (more than 23 minutes instead of few seconds when using the above transfor-
mation).
5. Results and Discussions
To test our approach, we used a real network traffic generated from the different DDoS
attacks tool such as Trinoo, Stacheldraht, TFN, etc. We are interested in the flooding
traffic generated by the exploited agents of these tools over Internet to attack a victim.
More precisely, we are interested in syn-flooding, smurfing. The second test concerns
the probing attacks such as IPSweep and Portsweep using the well known nmap and
superscan tools. And the last attack is the slammer worm that has infected thousands of
machines over Internet in less than 10 minutes. For each of these attacks, we used the Bro
tool to extract the different features and apply the different PCA steps as explained above.
On the other hand we tested our method on a variety of normal traffic.
We present here just one dataset for each category because all the experiments we have
done for each of them does not differ from one to the other in each sample for the same
category.
In the following, we examine from table ?? the different statistical measures obtained
from our analysis.
We mention that Comp
i
Loading corresponds to the Pearson’s correlation coefficient
between the more influential original variable and the ith principal component. For exam-
ple the smurfing traffic has a loading value of 0:99 concerning the first principal compo-
nent in which the more influential variable in forming this first principal component is IP
Src.
The PC
i
Loading corresponds to the ith principal component variance for the corre-
sponding attack (or normal) traffic experiment.
All the results presented in table ?? are expected. In the case of the slammer attack,
a vulnerable server launches many UDP/1434 packets to different addresses randomly
calculated from the received packet whose goal is a buffer overflow exploit. These packets
share the same characteristics as the received packet but are sent to different addresses
over Internet to crash as many vulnerable servers as possible. In addition, the source
IP address and the source port address remain unaltered as the packet length and the
destination port (UDP/1434). However, the difference is in the destination IP address
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Table 1 The different statistical measures obtained from the different experiments
Measures PC1 PC2 PC1 PC2 cumulative
Traffic Loading Loading Variance Variance variance
Normal 0.69(Port Src) 0.68(Port Dest) 0.71 0.28 0.99
IPSweep 0.98(IP Dest) 0.15(Port Dest) 0.49 0.48 0.97
Portsweep 0.98(Port Dest) 0.17(Port Src) 0.63 0.35 0.98
Smurfing 0.99(IP Src) 0.21(Data Hash) 0.42 0.20 0.62
synflood 0.96(Port Src) 0.95(IP Source) 0.83 0.16 0.99
Slammer 0.99(IP Dest) 0.11(Data Hash) 0.45 0.30 0.75
whose variance is very high (not showed in the table). Therefore the IP Dest feature is the
variable that is much affecting the first principal component due to its substantial portion
of the total variance in the original dataset captured from the network traffic concerning
the slammer attack.
The smurf attack does not differ from the slammer attack according to our analysis
since the same packet (echo reply) is from thousands machines against one victim. How-
ever, this attack traffic is collected in the victim side and the slammer’s traffic is collected
from the vulnerable machine (running a vulnerable mysql service) that has been attacked
and that has started to attack thousands machines over Internet.
For IPsweep attack, the most influential variable for the first component is IP Dest
feature since this attack consists in probing the different machines that are available in a
target network. On the other hand, Port Dest is the most influential variable for the first
principal component, concerning the Portsweep attack, since this attack tries to scan the
different ports on a machine hoping to find out the different services that are available in
that machine.
The syn-flooding attack consists in sending thousands of open connection packets
against a server in order to overwhelm it and then renders its service unavailable. The
tool we used exploits the IP spoofing technique and changes quickly its source ports num-
bers in order to be unnoticed by the target machine. This is why the first and the second
PCs for this experiment are more affected by the Port Src and IP Source features.
We notice that the loading values of the first two principal components in the normal
traffic are similar and the influential variables are Port Src and Port Dest since this situa-
tion corresponds to the balance in the variance of the different packets exchanged between
a client and a server, and any other normal traffic between two machines, with respect to
the source and destination ports.
Labib and Vemuri used in [?] some attacks from the DARPA98 [?] to validate their
method. They propose a simple algorithm based on calculating a threshold T presented in
equation (??)
T =j l
1
  l
2
j p
v
 100 (22)
where l
i
corresponds to the loading value of the ith principal component.
Therefore, they set a fixed value to which this threshold is compared. The value of
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C = 1 is an example they give for their experiments to accommodate the various traffic
patterns in the monitored network.
Since the data from the DARPA98 are not general and the different tools used to col-
lect the different TCPDump traffic were not modified, they were used with their default
form. Hence, an attacker changing the code of these tools, by modifying for example the
Source IP address that may change in every packet launched against the victim, may never
be detected with the above threshold presented in equation (??). As an example the syn-
flooding attack (that corresponds to the syn flood attack of the TFN tool (available since
2000)) will never be detected since the loading of the first principal components are quite
similar.
Using the different measures presented in table ??, we propose a simple technique
that is used in real time to detect the considered attacks:
BEGINSimple Algorithm to detect new attacks
IF (the first two loadings are calculated using the source port and destination port) THEN
IF (0:60  PC
i
Loading
i=1;2
 0:80) THEN
IF T =j l
1
  l
2
j p
v
 100 < 1 THEN
This is a normal traffic
ELSE
This is abnormal traffic (considered as a new attack that we do not know to
what it corresponds, for the moment, therefore investigation should be done
to discover to what this traffic corresponds to)
ENDIF
ENDIF
ELSE IF (PC
1
Loading > 0:97) THEN
It is an attack corresponding to one of the above presented attacks.
ELSE
This is a new traffic that we consider for instance as abnormal.
Investigation should be performed to discover to what this
traffic corresponds to.
ENDIF
END
The above method is different from that presented in [?] since it does not only de-
tect the different attacks as those experimented in this study but also detects those that
are not considered in the experiments. However, for the different measures values that
are not covered in the different attacks used in our experiment and that may appear in
real life, we consider them as new attacks and investigation should be performed over the
data traffic that has provided this new traffic whose measures are not met before. This last
point is neither studied nor explained in [?]. This is the reason why we call this technique
unsupervised approach since we do not have any ideas of the attacks we have not yet met.
Using the above simple algorithm with the different attacks considered we may obtain
100% of true detection rate and 0% of false alarms (false positive and false negative).
Since we do not have any knowledge of other new attacks, investigation should be
done when new measures not covered by the above tests.
A Bi-Plot tool is used in [?] to visualize the different variables and network traffic in a
The two boundaries 0:60 and 0:80 are issued from the different normal traffic datasets used in our different
experiments not shown in table ??.
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2D dimensional space. This is a good idea when we deal with an offline traffic analysis.
However, in real life we cannot do so because in DoS (then DDoS) or Slammer attacks,
we receive more than 60000 packets per second in our platform that does not permit to
visualize the different measures in real time. However, the above algorithm is always
valid since it is just generating alerts when it is necessary. On the other hand, a posterior
analysis with PCA is always possible and a Bi-Plot tool may help the security officer to
analyze the suspected traffic off line.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a new unsupervised anomaly detection algorithm using prin-
cipal component analysis to detect new attacks. We investigated the principal component
analysis and exploited the mathematical model that permits to reduce the space and calcu-
late the eigenvectors and eigenvalues in a shorter time unlike the work of other researchers
that have not taken into account the mathematical aspects of PCA in particular when we
are confronted to the new generation high speed networks. Another advantage of the sim-
plified algorithm that we have proposed, in addition to detecting the experimented attacks
and differentiating them from normal network traffic, is its ability to detect new anomalies
that are not considered in our test since the behavior of the network traffic is not finite and
new protocols are investigated and added gradually to the Internet community. We believe
that the robustness of our algorithm is not at maximum since we do not find new attacks
that are different from those we have investigated in this paper. However, we should men-
tion that other attacks of the type U2R (User to Root) and R2L (Remote to Local) [?]
are not investigated in this paper. This is because we used only the packet header fields
and did not investigate the payload. A hash value of the payload is used, as a summary of
the payload, but it does not give high variance in the different experiments we conducted.
We believe that investigating the payload in depth by considering new IP Packet fields in
the packet feature vector may produce new attacks detection. This will be discussed in a
forthcoming paper.
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